Adolf Hitler was notorious for issuing highly detailed orders to individual units fighting on the Eastern Front, cutting out the German army’s entire command staff from leading its troops in war. Yet, the very same technologies also pushed a trend “towards centralization of command, and thus towards micromanagement.” 3įor instance, when telegraphs were introduced during the Crimean War (1853–56), generals sipping tea back in England quickly figured out that they could send daily plans to the front lines in Russia. Generals no longer needed to be on the front lines with their men but operated from command posts that moved further to the rear with each new technological advance.

With the rise of each new generation of communications technology, these connections between soldiers in the field and those who give them orders grew distanced. In The Face of Battle, his masterful history of men at war, John Keegan writes how “the personal bond between leader and follower lies at the root of all explanations of what does and does not happen in battle.” 2 In Keegan’s view, the exemplar of this relationship was Henry V, who inspired his “band of brothers” by fighting in their midst during the Battle of Agincourt. But his role in the operation didn’t end there the general proudly tells how he even decided what size bomb his pilots should drop on the compound. Having personally checked the situation, he gave the order to strike.

The compound was a legitimate target, and any civilians in the houses had to know that it was being used for war, what with all the armed men moving about. He waited as other insurgents entered and exited the compound, openly carrying weapons. Sitting behind a live video feed from a Predator unmanned aircraft system (UAS), he saw two insurgent leaders sneak into a compound of houses. The four-star general proudly recounts how he spent “two hours watching footage” beamed to his headquarters.

Strategic war robots planning